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I.

This Case Presents The Circuit Conflicts
Described In The Petition

A. The first conflict described in the petition, regarding the respective roles of courts and juries in free
speech cases, is not limited to whether the court or a
jury is to decide subsidiary factual disputes related to
Pickering balancing. See Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 567 (1968). The courts of appeals
disagree as well about whether a court or jury should
decide subsidiary factual disputes related to whether
an employee spoke "as a citizen." See Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). Both aspects of that conflict
matter here, because there were disputed facts related
to both constitutional issues.
There is no disagreement about the nature of the
Fourth Circuit standard. The court below held that
"whether the speech was made as a citizen," as well as
Pickering balancing, are "questions of law." App. 9a10a; see id. 12a ("courts [are] to engage in a practical
inquiry into the employee’s daily professional activities" (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); 13a ("courts must look beyond formal job
descriptions" (emphasis added)). Under the decision
below, the only "factual inquiry" is about whether the
speech at issue "caused the disciplinary action." Id.
10a. Respondent defends the Fourth Circuit standard,
arguing that courts, not juries, should decide any subsidiary factual questions related to whether speech
was constitutionally protected. Br.Opp. 5.

Conversely, as the petition explained, other circuits treat as jury issues subsidiary factual disputes
related to whether an employee spoke as a citizen, as
well as those related to Pickering balaacing. In the
Eighth Circuit "any underlying factual disputes concerning whether the plaintiff’s speech is protected ...
should be submitted to the jury." Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.3d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1993) (emphasis
added; quoted at Pet. 19-20). The Tenth Circuit precedent requires that juries decide questions of historical
fact in First Amendment cases generally, and is not
limited to claims regarding speech by government employees. Weaver v. Chavez, 458 F.3d 1096, 1101-02
(10th Cir. 2006) (quoted at Pet. 20). In Posey v. Lake
Pend Oreille School Dist., 526 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoted at Pet. 20), the Ninth Circuit addressed specifically the role of a jury in determining subsidiary questions of fact related to whether an employee spoke as
a citizen. "[W]e agree with the Third, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits and hold that the determination
whether speech ... was spoken as a public employee or
a private citizen presents a mixed question of fact and
law .... IT]he scope and content of a plaintiff’s job responsibilities can and should be found by a trier of
fact .... " 526 F.3d at 1129. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Fifth, Tenth and District of Columbia
Circuits, like the Fourth Circuit in this case, apply the
contrary rule. 526 F.3d at 1127-28. In Fox v. Traverse
City Area Public Schools Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 345,
350 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit noted the existence of this specific conflict.
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Respondent argues that any circuit split regarding
whether courts or juries should decide such subsidiary
factual issues does not matter here, because in this
case there were no "instances of conflicting or disputed
evidence." Br.Opp. 10 n.3. That is clearly incorrect. The
petition describes in considerable detail the conflicting
evidence in this case. Pet. 11-14. Respondent does not
in any way disagree with that summary of the evidentiary disputes, or refer to it at all. Even if there were
factual disputes, respondent contends, the petition did
not "identif[y]" any instance in which the Fourth Circuit failed to "view the material facts in a light most
favorable to the Petitioners." Br.Opp. 10. To the contrary, the petition specifically spells out key factual
disputes resolved by the Fourth Circuit in favor of respondent. Pet. 21-22.
Respondent argues that the Fourth Circuit rule is
not "germane" to this case because this appeal involves
a summary judgment motion regarding qualified immunity. Br.Opp. 11. But the Fourth Circuit itself certainly believed that standard was germane to this
appeal; that is the standard which the court of appeals
announced and applied. The decision cited by the court
below as establishing that standard, Brooks v. Arthur,
685 F.3d 367,371 (4th Cir. 2012), was itself a summary
judgment case. The panel’s actual reasoning, repeatedly relying on Chief Caldwell’s disputed account of
the facts, removes any doubt that the court below was
actually applying the very standard which respondent
objects was not germane. Respondent may believe that
the authority of courts to decide subsidiary factual
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issues in free speech cases should be exercised only at
a trial on the merits (Br.Opp. 8), but it does not contend
that the Fourth Circuit, in this case or any other, has
ever imposed that limitation.
B. There is no disagreement about the constitutional standard that the Fourth Circuit used regarding
Pickering balancing. At the time of the violation at issue, Fourth Circuit law did not recognize the three
types of lessened protection announced in the decision
below; a decision by this Court rejecting those new limitations on free speech would thus defeat the defendant’s claim of qualified immunity.
The brief in opposition includes a one-sentence pro
forma denial of the existence of a circuit conflict about
those issues. "Petitioners are attempting to create a
circuit conflict where none really exists." Br.Opp. 12.
But the brief in opposition says nothing at all about
the multi-faceted conflict detailed in the petition. Pet.
23-33.
Respondent contends that in Connick this Court
directed lower courts to rate the value of an employee’s
speech, when it held that the "manner, time and place"
of speech are "relevant" to Pickering balancing. Br.Opp.
13 (quoting 461 U.S. at 152). But the passage in Connick quoted by respondent states only that the time,
place and manner of the employee’s speech are relevant to magnitude of the employer’s interest, noting
that those circumstances may affect the level of
"threat[]" the speech poses to "the employing agency’s
institutional efficiency." 461 U.S. at 152.
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Respondent argues that "a decision based entirely
on a... qualified immunity analysis does not decide the
merits of the underlying constitutional dispute and,
hence, does not establish any precedent that warrants
the issuance of a writ of certiorari." Br.Opp. 7. But a
court ruling on a qualified immunity defense necessarily sets out the substantive legal standard to be
used in determining whether the action of the defendant was clearly unconstitutional. That is precisely
what occurred in this case. The panel held that the defendant could reasonably have believed the plaintiffs’
speech was unprotected because as a legal matter
speech enjoys lesser constitutional protection if it is
private, if it is engaged in for personal reasons, or if it
is not well informed. App. 14a. The legal standard regarding Pickering balancing announced by the panel
in this officially reported case is now controlling precedent in the Fourth Circuit; the precedential significance of the court of appeals decision is the same
regardless of whether those standards were established and applied in a qualified immunity case or in a
decision about the merits.
The decision below dramatically expands the circumstances in which defendants in the Fourth Circuit
can in the future establish qualified immunity. In light
of the decision in this case, a defendant may now argue
that a reasonable official in that circuit could believe
that speech on a matter of public concern is less protected (and thus likely to fail Pickering balancing) under any of the reduced-protection standards spelled
out in the opinion below. Conversely, an employee who
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seeks legal counsel before speaking will be advised
that his or her speech is far more likely to be protected
if disseminated to a very large public group rather
than being raised internally.
The court of appeals’ decision rested on two
independent grounds (and related constitutional
standards), one applying the Fourth Circuit’s standard regarding Pickering balancing, and the other applying the court of appeals’ standard regarding when
an employee speaks as a citizen. When a lower court
decision rests on two independent grounds, this Court
regularly grants review of both. E.g., County of Los
Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S.Ct. 1539 (2017). That is what
the Court should do in this case. The circuit conflict
regarding whether a court or jury should decide subsidiary fact issues is in this case inextricably intertwined with both of the issues of substantive
constitutional law.
C. Respondent argues that the Fourth Circuit
held that a government employee is unprotected under
Garcetti only when the employee engages in the speech
that is one of his or her job duties. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). That is not a plausible interpretation of the decision below.
When the Fourth Circuit referred to the "duties" of
the plaintiffs, it did not require that handing out complaint forms have been one of their actual job duties, or
hold that it was. Instead, the court of appeals held that
Garcetti applied because handing out such a form was
merely "connect led]" to or "resemble [d]" the plaintiffs’
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duties. App. 14a. But most employee speech that gives
rise to First Amendment claims is "connected" to the
speaker’s job, in the sense that it has something to do
with the agency for which the employee works. Garcetti removes speech from constitutional protection
only when it is made "pursuant to" an employee’s duties. 547 U.S. at 421. In Givhan v. Western Line School
Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979), all the plaintiff’s speech
concerned "policies and practices at [the] school" where
she taught. This Court nonetheless held that her
speech was protected, explaining that "[t]he First
Amendment protects some expression related to the
speaker’s job." Givhan, 439 U.S. at 421. Similarly, to
say, without more, that a task merely "resembles" a job
duty is implicitly to acknowledge that the task is not
in fact an actual duty at all. The difference between the
rule announced in Garcetti (and applied in other circuits), that an employee’s speech is unprotected only if
that speech is part of his or her actual job duties, and
the Fourth Circuit rule that speech is unprotected
whenever it merely is "connected to" or "resembles"
those duties, is not a semantic distinction. The Fourth
Circuit’s sweeping rule would largely eviscerate the
First Amendment rights of public employees.
The "facts" cited by the Fourth Circuit as indicating the plaintiffs "sp[o]ke ... as employees" make clear
that the court of appeals’ standard does not require an
actual job duty. The three critical facts were that
Berkeley knew that Crouse and Winningham were police officers, that the plaintiffs were "on call" (although
at lunch) when they engaged in the speech, and that
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they gave Berkeley a "town form." App. 14a. The fact
that the person who witnesses speech knows the
speaker is a public employee has nothing to do with
whether that speech is a job duty; a government employee’s families and friends, for example, always know
where he or she works. Marvin Pickering mentioned in
his letter to the editor that he was a public school
teacher. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 576. The fact that the
plaintiffs were "on call" while at lunch is equally unrelated to whether the content of their speech was a job
duty; that would have been true if the plaintiffs had
dropped by Mr. Berkeley’s home to discuss the Carolina Panthers draft selections. Bessie Givhan was at
the school where she worked when she complained
about racial discrimination. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415.
The fact that the plaintiffs gave out a town form would
be relevant under Garcetti only if giving out that particular form was part of their job. But all the witnesses
agreed that this was not one of the job responsibilities
of a Moncks Corner police officer. Pet. 13-14.
Respondent asserts that the Fourth Circuit "concluded that the information available to Chief Caldwell would lead a reasonable police chief to believe that
the Petitioners were acting within the scope of their
official duties when they delivered a copy of the police
department’s citizen complaint form to James Berkeley." Br.Opp. 15-16. That clearly inaccurate assertion
confirms the actual nature of the Fourth Circuit standard. First, there is no such finding in the court of appeals opinion; this assertion is not accompanied by any
citation to the decision below. Second, there is nothing
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at all in the record about "the information available to
Chief Caldwell" concerning the plaintiffs’ duties. Third,
there has never been a claim in this case, nor could
there be, that Caldwell might have misunderstood
what the plaintiffs’ job duties were. The Moncks Corner Police Department had fewer than 25 officers, and
the Chief would obviously have known what the officers’ duties were; all the officers who testified knew
what those duties were, and were not.
The decision below dramatically expands the circumstances in which defendants in the Fourth Circuit
can assert qualified immunity. In light of the decision
in this case, a defendant in that circuit may now argue
that a reasonable official could believe that under Garcetti public employees have no First Amendment protection when their speech, although not a job duty,
merely is "connected to" or "resembles" their work. At
the time of the violation at issue, Fourth Circuit law
did not yet hold that speech loses protection under Garcetti if it merely is connected to or resembles a worker’s
actual duties; a decision by this Court rejecting that
new limitation on free speech would thus defeat the
defendant’s claim of qualified immunity.
II. This Case Is of Exceptional Importance
The issues in this case reflect a problem of unique
and increasingly urgent national importance. The use
of excessive force by law enforcement officers, once a
matter primarily of concern in the Black and Hispanic
communities, has with the advent of widely-viewed
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video recordings garnered the attention of the entire
country. A series of investigations by the United States
Department of Justice has documented in several major police departments both systematic abuse and a
lack of internal controls. Although the circumstances
of particular cases are understandably matters of dispute, even the staunchest supporters of law enforcement recognize that this problem is sufficiently
widespread, and visible, to undermine public confidence in and cooperation with the police.
A key cause of the persistence of this intractable
problem has been the unwillingness of individual police officers to speak out when they witness or
learn about the use of excessive force. Their failure to
do so is of particular consequence, because police officers are often the key witnesses, sometimes the only
surviving witnesses, when force is used, and they may
have a unique understanding of the events, based on
their years of law enforcement experience or their
knowledge of the fellow officers involved. Police officers
who raise these issues within their own departments
may permit, or indeed compel, those departments to
address internal problems before they result in litigation, or further injuries. But the vital role that law enforcement officials themselves could and should play
in preventing and correcting the use of excessive force
has too often been stifled by what the Department of
Justice has accurately characterized as a "code of silence.’’1 The President of the Chicago police officer’s
1 United States Department of Justice, Investigation of the
Chicago Police Department ("Chicago Report"), 8, 75 (January 13,
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union "admitted to ... a code of silence within [Chicago
Police Department], saying ’there’s a code of silence
everywhere, everybody has it.’ ,,2 That widespread and
deeply engrained code of silence has been enforced by
reprisals, both by fellow officers and by higher police
officials, against police officers with the courage and
candor to speak up.
The First Amendment guarantee of free speech
ought to provide at least some protection from such retaliation. But the Fourth Circuit decision in the instant
case effectively constitutionalizes the use of reprisals
to enforce a code of silence. In virtually every case, if a
police officer says anything about the use of excessive
force, his or her statement will be "connect[ed]" to the
officer’s job, a connection that under the decision below
is likely to be fatal to any First Amendment claim. An
officer who takes the entirely responsible step of trying
to deal with a problem internally, rather than publically denouncing his or her department or fellow officers, is likely to forfeit any First Amendment protection
because the speech involved will be directed to only one
or two individuals.
As Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent in
Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S.Ct. 1277
(2017), this Court has repeatedly granted review at the
behest of officers charged with having used excessive
2o17); United States Department of Justice, Investigation of the
Baltimore City Police Department, 151-53 (August 10, 2016); see
https://www.themarshallproject.org/record/605-blue-wall-of-silence.
2 Chicago Report, 75.
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force, even though the application of qualified immunity may well leave without remedy the victims of constitutional violations, or their bereaved families. It is
equally important that this Court’s discretion be exercised to protect officers who attempt to prevent, or correct, such constitutional violations. In his concurring
opinion in Salazar-Limon, Justice Alito observed that
this Court’s decisions to grant review of petitions filed
by defendants in excessive force cases reflect no indifference to the constitutional violations alleged, but rather the application of"uniform standards [of] review."
137 S.Ct. at 1278. The Court stood ready to apply those
same standards of review, he suggested, to a petition
on behalf of plaintiffs who opposed the use of excessive
force, if a "lower court conspicuously failed to apply a
governing legal rule." Id. This is that case.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
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